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Abstract
Based on a small-scale qualitative research project with 
Iraqis living in 6th of October City, one of Cairo’s satellite 
cities, the paper explores the role shift ing social identities 
play in Iraqis’ experience of migration and forced displace-
ment. In doing so, it focuses on three major themes emer-
ging from the ethnographic material. First, it discusses 
the relation between social change in the homeland and 
other dimensions of Iraqis’ belonging, particularly ethno-
religious sectarianism. Secondly, it analyzes the role edu-
cation and work play in the strategies refugees employ to 
resist dispossession, as well as in the practices through 
which other categories of Iraqi migrants rewrite their social 
identities. Finally, Iraqis’ relation with Egyptian society is 
briefl y explored. Th e fi ndings are discussed in relation to 
existing literature about social and political change in post-
2003 Iraq, but also in contemporary Egypt. In doing so, I 
hope to contribute to re-embed the study of Iraqi migration 
within the Middle East in its historical and socio-political 
context, moving beyond policy-driven approaches.
Résumé
Basée sur une recherche qualitative à petite échelle auprès 
des Irakiens vivant dans la Ville du 6 octobre, une des vil-
les satellites du Caire, cet article explore le rôle que tien-
nent les identités sociales changeantes dans l’expérience 
que font ces Irakiens de la migration et du déplacement 
forcé. On s’y concentre plus particulièrement sur trois 
thèmes majeurs ressortant du matériel ethnographique 
collecté. Premièrement, on examine les relations entre les 
changements sociaux du pays d’origine et les autres dimen-
sions de l’appartenance irakienne telles que le sectarisme 
ethno-religieux. Deuxièmement, on y analyse le rôle de 
l’éducation et du travail dans les stratégies des réfugiés 
pour éviter l’appauvrissement, ainsi que dans les pratiques 
employées par d’autres catégories de migrants irakiens 
pour réécrire leurs identités sociales. Enfi n, on y explore 
brièvement les relations des irakiens avec la société égyp-
tienne. L’auteur met ses observations en relation avec les 
études eff ectuées au sujet des changements sociaux et poli-
tiques dans l’Irak d’après 2003, mais également avec celles 
portant sur l’Égypte contemporaine. Cette étude vise enfi n 
à remettre dans son contexte historique et socio-politique 
l’étude de la migration irakienne au sein du Moyen Orient, 
tout en dépassant les approches centrées sur les politiques 
de migration.
Introduction
Research on Iraqis in Egypt has stemmed from the need to 
provide policy responses to the refugee fl ow that invested 
Iraq’s neighbouring countries aft er the 2003 US-led inva-
sion. Th e size of the phenomenon has been much smaller 
in Egypt than elsewhere in the Middle East, yet existing 
research about Iraqis in the country is mostly emergency 
and policy driven. Géraldine Chatelard suggests that this 
approach, based on the paradigm of refugees’ visibility, con-
ceals historical continuities in over three decades of migra-
tion from Iraq.1 Chatelard argues for re-embedding the 
study of Iraqi migration, looking at the role regional pol-
itical and social dynamics play in determining this move-
ment of people.2 Th is paper off ers a limited contribution 
to this theoretical re-embedding. Although the size of the 
study suggests cautions with theoretical generalizations, 
the fi ndings resonate with some of the insights provided 
by existing literature on Iraqis in the region. In particu-
lar, they highlight the relevance of social mobility in Iraqis’ 
experience of displacement and migration. Th ey point to 
the importance of understanding how social class intersects 
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other dimensions of Iraqis’ identity, in particular the ethno-
religious one, and how these infl uence their prospects for 
further migration and local integration. Finally, they sug-
gest that social, as well as legal and political dynamics in the 
host country should not be overlooked when accounting for 
the experience of Iraqis displaced within the region. Th is 
is particularly important when considering the strategies 
refugees adopt to deal with downward social mobility in a 
protracted refugee situation.3
Iraqi Migration to Egypt
Although a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention, Egypt 
does not have a national asylum law. Kagan defi nes the legal 
framework for refugee protection in the country as “regret-
tably confusing,” highlighting three major factors which 
contribute to this uncertainty.4 First, implementation of 
refugee and migration policies in the country has oft en been 
the result of arbitrary governmental choices rather than of 
the application of international laws. Secondly, Egypt has 
introduced important reservations to the 1951 refugee con-
vention, limiting refugees’ access to economic and social 
rights. Finally, refugee rights have been further limited by 
the signature of the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). A result of the MOU is that determina-
tion of refugee status is carried out by UNHCR exclusively. 
Upon obtaining refugee documentation from UNHCR (yel-
low cards for asylum seekers and blue cards for recognized 
refugees), refugees are expected to report their cases to the 
Ministry of Foreign Aff airs. Th e latter subsequently asks 
the Ministry of the Interior to issue a six-month residence 
permit. However, Iraqi refugees who arrived in the country 
aft er 2003 have been considered as prima facie refugees and 
did not go through individual refugee status determination.5 
Th e policy adopted by UNHCR results from a “favorable 
presumption” about the legal validity of Iraqis’ claims, and 
signifi cantly improved their living conditions.6 However, 
generalized access to refugee status might also have contrib-
uted to hide the complex interplay of economic, social, and 
historical factors that determine this migration. As will be 
shown below, not all Iraqis in Egypt consider themselves to 
be refugees. Some of them have access to residence permits 
as investors or students, and choose not to apply for refu-
gee status. However, migration patterns are complex and 
mixed migration common.7 Moreover, self-perceptions 
and attitudes towards refugee status oft en shift  over time. 
A brief analysis of available fi gures confi rms this complex-
ity. According to entry data, between 100,000 and 150,000 
Iraqis would have settled in the country, mainly between 
2006 and 2008, when the Egyptian government put a halt 
to the issue of entry visas.8 In 2008, 10,000 Iraqis were in 
possession of UNHCR documentation, while at the end of 
2009 there were only 6,572 registered refugees. Th is points 
to the high mobility of Iraqis in Egypt, among whom self-
repatriation and resettlement are deemed to be common. In 
2010, however, numbers grew again. In 2011, 7,157 Iraqi refu-
gees were reported to be registered with UNHCR.9 It is likely 
that many Iraqis avoided registration in the fi rst years of 
residence in Egypt, perceiving their migration as temporary, 
and turned to UNHCR at a later time, when both prospects 
for return and private fi nancial resources deteriorated.
Most Iraqis settled in the Egyptian capital—particularly 
in the areas of 6th of October City and Madinet Nasr—and, 
to a lesser extent, in Alexandria. Between 2006 and 2008 
they rapidly became the second-largest national group 
among Egypt’s immigrant population, aft er Sudanese.10 
As a consequence, local and international non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) working as UNHCR imple-
menting partners put in place services which targeted Iraqis 
exclusively. Predominant narratives among practitioners 
describe Iraqis as a cluster of refugees whose demands are 
particularly diffi  cult to respond to. As the manager of an 
international charity remarked, “Over 70 percent of the 
Iraqi families we work with suff er from anxiety disorder 
and would benefi t from some sort of psychological counsel-
ing.”11 She added that the causes of this anxiety were rather 
diffi  cult to understand, as their living conditions generally 
were better than those of other refugee groups. Interviews 
with other NGO workers confi rm this perception. Concerns 
about the deterioration of their social and fi nancial status, 
linked to lack of legal access to work and public services, 
are reportedly one of the main reasons why Iraqis perceive 
themselves as vulnerable. Middle-class anxieties about chil-
dren’s education and standards of living characterize Iraqi 
refugees in the narratives of most humanitarian practition-
ers in Egypt. However, it should be noted how the majority 
of them do not belong to Iraq’s wealthiest social strata. Th e 
post-2003 Iraqi displacement is deemed to have taken place 
in three major waves.12 Former regime elites and upper-
middle-class professionals and intellectuals would have 
fl ed between 2003 and 2005, while most Iraqis in Egypt left  
their country aft er the outbreak of sectarian violence which 
followed the 2006 Samarra bombings. Th is third migra-
tory movement is deemed to have been the largest, involv-
ing people from diff erent ethno-sectarian and social back-
grounds.13 Th e encounters I had with Iraqis in Cairo’s 6th of 
October City confi rm this picture of socio-cultural and reli-
gious diversity. Although the majority of the people included 
in this study were Arabs and Sunni Muslims—refl ecting 
the overall ethno-religious composition of the Iraqi popula-
tion in Egypt14—a minority of Shiites and a small number 
of Christian families were resident in the neighbourhood 
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when the study was conducted. Some of the Iraqis I met 
had chosen Egypt as a destination for its relatively low liv-
ing costs, as well as for the availability of resettlement pro-
grams.15 Th ey had therefore applied for refugee status and 
sought humanitarian assistance since their arrival in the 
country. Others, however, had moved to Egypt counting on 
a signifi cant amount of private savings, which they had been 
able to invest in entrepreneurial activities—from small gro-
cery shops to factories and import-export companies. Th e 
ethnographic accounts examined below help to shed light 
on the relationship between these two diff erent categories of 
migrants. More importantly, they suggest that class percep-
tions and performances, infl uenced by Iraqi refugees con-
tacts with the hosting society, can be productively studied 
in their dialectic relation with other dimensions of Iraqis’ 
identities. Th e fi ndings are therefore discussed in the light 
of historical and theoretical considerations on the socio-
economic background of the Iraqi displacement, as well as 
on the Egyptian social and urban context.
Methods and Research Location
Th e paper is based on ethnographic research with Iraqi 
migrants living in 6th of October City, one of Cairo’s sat-
ellite cities, carried out for a period of about four months. 
During it, I was hosted by a family of refugees from 
Baghdad, living in 6th of October City’s 7th District, whom 
I met teaching English as a volunteer to their youngest son. 
Th e family members helped me to snowball among their 
contacts, friends, and neighbours. Volunteer work pro-
vided me with opportunities to recruit other participants, 
diversifying my contacts. In total, I conducted participant 
observation with three diff erent family units, in addition to 
in-depth, unstructured interviews with 20 individuals from 
diff erent social backgrounds. I also interviewed practition-
ers from six diff erent NGOs working on refugee assistance.
Th e majority of my Iraqi informants were from Baghdad. 
Only three of them were originally from other districts in 
central and southern Iraq. However, all had close relatives 
living in the capital, or had lived there themselves for study 
or work. As already remarked, all the participants, with 
the exception of one family of Christians, were Arabs and 
Sunni Muslims, refl ecting the ethno-religious composition 
of the larger population. As a female researcher, building a 
rapport with women was generally easier for me. However, 
men are slightly more represented among my informants. 
Shift ing gender relations in Iraqis’ experience of migra-
tion are briefl y analyzed in the discussion of the fi ndings. 
However, an in-depth account of the relation between 
gender, migration, and social mobility in the case of Iraqis 
in Egypt would require a theoretical and empirical engage-
ment that exceeds the scope of this paper. Knowing Modern 
Standard Arabic and colloquial Egyptian, and working with 
people who generally had a relatively good command of 
English, in most cases I was able to conduct the interviews 
by myself. In some others I needed assistance with transla-
tion of recorded material from Iraqi Arabic into English.
Th e choice of 6th of October City as a research location 
was dictated by its being a well-known local hub for Iraqi 
migrants. Built at the beginning of the 1980s as a result of 
plans for industrial development in the Giza desert pla-
teau,16 about 30 kilometres northwest of the Egyptian 
capital, 6th of October hosts around one million residents. 
While workers employed in factories and low-skilled service 
jobs can be found living in its outskirts, many Egyptians 
who moved there in the 1980s and 1990s were nouveaux 
riches. Alongside industrial sites and middle-class residen-
tial areas, gated communities, Saudi-owned shopping malls, 
and international hotels mark the local landscape. As sev-
eral other suburbs and new towns, 6th of October can be 
regarded as a product of urban and social change in neo-
liberal Egypt, characterized as it is by spatialized markers 
of social stratifi cation and defensive home ownership.17 
Moreover, the place off ers insights about the role of inter-
national migration in these processes. Egyptian returnees 
from Europe and the Gulf, who invested their remittances 
in remunerative commercial activities, traditionally consti-
tute a signifi cant part of 6th of October City’s new rich. Since 
the late 1990s, foreign investors from Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates, and central Asia, as well as students from Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and other Gulf states, have joined this emer-
ging bourgeoisie, making of 6th of October an interesting 
example of regional cosmopolitanism. In it, Iraqis are one 
of the most recently settled, yet by far the largest, national 
group. In the 7th District, the area of 6th of October City 
where the UNHCR offi  ce is located and the concentration 
of Iraqis is higher, their presence is rather visible. Although 
this visibility is reported to have decreased since 2008, due 
to repatriation and resettlement, Iraqi ethnic stores, coff ee 
shops, and bakeries are still present. Th e landscape evokes 
a sense of cohesion and diasporic national belonging which 
is diffi  cult to fi nd in Iraqis’ narratives. Th e following section 
explores the dynamics of and reasons for this lack of sense 
of community among the Iraqis I have worked with. In 
doing so, I raise some questions on the relationship between 
ethno-religious identity and economic and social change in 
contemporary Iraq, as refl ected in the Iraqi diaspora.
Ethno-religious Sectarianism, Social Change, and 
Displacement in Post-2003 Iraq
Sectarianism and sectarian violence are the dominating 
paradigm in media representations of the Iraqi confl ict 
and displacement. Similarly, in the interviews I conducted 
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among humanitarian practitioners, community networks 
among Iraqi refugees are oft en described as fragmented 
along ethnic and religious lines. Overall, my participant 
observation can not be said to contradict these perceptions. 
It rather confi rms the existence of what a humanitarian 
worker defi ned as “an all-permeating feeling of mistrust” 
that would prevent Iraqis in Cairo from developing a bind-
ing sense of community.18 However, some questions about 
the nature and roots of these divisions can be raised. Th e 
Iraqis I met did mention ethnic and religious diff erences 
when discussing their problems in Iraq and Egypt, yet they 
generally attributed only relative importance to them. Th is 
is probably due to the fact that, in their neighbourhood 
in Cairo, they found themselves in a rather homogenous 
environment, in which Arab Sunni Muslims are the preva-
lent group among both locals and immigrants. Nevertheless, 
some of the interviews also resonate with existing literature 
that problematizes the category of religious and ethnic sect-
arianism in contemporary Iraq. Moreover, they point to the 
role social stratifi cation plays in causing divisions among 
Iraqi refugees.
Sarah,19 a single woman in her late 20s from Baghdad’s 
affl  uent neighbourhood of Hay al Jamaa, provides an inter-
esting example. She was the youngest daughter of a retired 
engineer employed in the public sector, living with her 
family in the 7th District. Th ey arrived in Egypt in 2007 and 
applied for asylum a few months aft erwards. Although they 
did not feel totally comfortable using the term, all members 
of the family defi ned themselves as refugees and hoped 
for resettlement to Canada or the United States through 
UNHCR. When asked about her relationship with her Iraqi 
neighbours in Egypt, Sarah explained:
… If they visit, it is just for courtesy, a social duty. It’s false courtesy. 
We don’t trust each other and I don’t like to hang out with them. 
Th ere are jealousy and envy. People envy your apartment if bigger 
than theirs, are jealous if you can pay for better private education 
for your children. Th e fact is, you know, Iraq changed. It is not 
the country it used to be and people have a narrower mind. Th ey 
would do anything for money. And if you need a job, you need to 
have relations, to be affi  liated to a political party. To be safe, you 
need the private militias of the party, of the religious group. If you 
don’t belong to these groups, you have to leave.20
Solidarity and mutual help, oft en explained as resulting 
from Islamic moral obligations, are present among Iraqis in 
6th of October City. It is not uncommon to fi nd groups of uni-
versity students organizing themselves to help widows living 
alone in Egypt, or to collect money to be donated to Egyptian 
orphanages and charitable institutions. Nevertheless, narra-
tives like Sarah’s are common. Solidarity and compassion 
are undermined by feelings of mistrust, suspicion, and envy. 
Th ese latter are signifi cant to the extent that they oft en deter-
mine choices about where to live, or where to seek fi nancial 
or humanitarian help. Two of the families included in the 
study reported avoiding contacts with NGOs employing 
Iraqis living in their neighbourhood as community facilita-
tors. Th ey did not trust their behaviour and, they said, their 
sources of revenue were “unclear.” It is likely that the deci-
sion to avoid contacts with specifi c organizations prevented 
them from receiving proper legal assistance, jeopardizing 
their application for resettlement.
As in Sarah’s quote, envy oft en results from competi-
tion over symbols of social status such as the size of one’s 
house and access to expensive private education or lack of 
it. Among the Iraqis I have worked with, this preoccupa-
tion with social status and “appearance” was oft en reported 
to have been a characteristic of Iraqi middle-class culture 
since the sanctions era (1991–2003), a perception which 
fi nds an echo in historiographies of contemporary Iraq.21 In 
line with Saddam Hussein’s nationalistic propaganda, what 
many Iraqis defi ne as “a culture of pride and dignity”22, was 
then aimed at concealing the harsh process of impoverish-
ment the country was undergoing. However, those who, like 
Sarah, belonged to middle-class families of former state-
employed professionals tended to consider competition over 
economic status as a new phenomenon that had appeared 
aft er the war. In their narratives sectarian divisions, moral 
corruption, and rampant social stratifi cation are strictly 
intertwined.
Existing literature describes this intermingling of eco-
nomic liberalization, dismantling of state apparatuses, and 
institutionalized sectarianism in contemporary Iraq.23 
Similar phenomena have also been observed in other coun-
tries in the region. For Fawaz, clientelism and religious sect-
arianism are the form the “entrenchment of market mech-
anisms into daily activities” has taken in post–civil war 
Lebanon.24 In the case of Iraq, Al Tikriti calls for a more 
careful consideration of the relation between ethno-reli-
gious divisions and policy choices in the aft ermath of war. 
While Iraqi ethnic, religious, and tribal identities have deep 
historical roots and were institutionalized under Ottoman 
rule, sectarian violence only broke out in specifi c moments 
throughout the country’s history.25 Aft er 2003, policies 
aimed at dismantling the army and the state bureaucracy 
had the eff ect of depriving Iraq of secular institutions. 
Violence targeting the educated urban middle classes 
caused massive internal and international displacement 
among upper social strata. Th is led to the destruction of the 
pre-existing social organization in which, as Al Tikriti con-
tends, affi  liation to political parties and secularized social 
identities prevailed over religious sectarianism, at least in 
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urban contexts.26 In the meantime, policies aimed at creat-
ing a new social and economic model were enforced.27 Th e 
provision of basic social and infrastructural services was 
delegated to non-state actors, leading to increasing political 
prominence of religious organizations. Th e urban geog-
raphies of Iraq were rearranged around ethno-religious 
segregation, and allegiances to religious parties and militias 
became a constitutive element of the social fabric.28 For 
some Iraqis I met in Egypt, the decision to leave the country 
was linked to their lack of integration in these new social 
networks. Th is was reported to imply not only vulnerability 
to violence, but also, as Sarah remarked, exclusion from the 
most profi table sectors of the job market.
Economic reasons are oft en important in Iraqis’ deci-
sion to leave their country.29 Aft er the war, the implemen-
tation of neo-liberal economic policies failed in improving 
employment rates.30 For large sections of the urban middle 
classes, this added economic precariousness to what has 
been defi ned as Iraq’s “generalized environment of insecur-
ity.”31 Economic policies are an important part of the social 
and institutional restructuring of Iraq. Aft er Paul Bremer’s 
Coalition Provisional Authority terminated its mandate 
in June 2004, power was handed over to the newly formed 
local government under condition of total adherence to 
the neo-liberal doctrine.32 Th is was “aimed at eliminating 
all vestiges of the Iraqi centrally planned economy ( … ) 
Assets, and indeed the mechanisms of economic govern-
ance, were transferred from the public sector to private 
actors.”33 Th e new policy included a rapid transition from 
state-led development to privatizations, dismantlement of 
large portions of the public sector, market deregulation, and 
creation of an export-oriented economy. Large-scale plans 
for economic liberalization, particularly in the agrarian 
sector, had been promoted by Saddam Hussein’s govern-
ment already in the early 1980s. Th e eff ects on working and 
lower-middle classes had been signifi cant, causing waves of 
political unrest, internal displacement, and international 
migration.34 However, this had been essentially a state-led 
process, which had preserved state bureaucracy as a source 
of employment. Th is process of economic infi tah (open-
ing) had been interrupted by the imposition of economic 
sanctions aft er the 1991 Gulf War, which condemned the 
country to international isolation.35 It was thus only aft er 
the war started in 2003 that a radical plan of economic neo-
liberalization was promoted.
Refugees in Cairo oft en point to the intertwining of 
economic privatization, sectarianism, and clientelism in 
explaining lack of security and social cohesion in contem-
porary Iraq. Th is concise historical overview helps to shed 
light on the complex roots of this perception. Th e ethno-reli-
gious homogeneity which characterizes Iraqis in Cairo does 
not allow drawing conclusions on the role of sectarianism 
among Iraqis in general. However, it should also be noted 
how the interactions observed between the one Christian 
family I met and their Muslim neighbours were devoid of 
tensions. None of the members of the family reported hav-
ing suff ered religious discrimination among their national 
community. Similarly, tensions and confl icts between the 
Sunni majority and the small number of Shiite refugees 
living in Cairo were rare. Shiites were rather reported to 
suff er discrimination by the Egyptian authorities. In 2006, 
these latter rejected a request to open a Shiite mosque in 
6th of October.36 Th e episode caused discontent, protests, 
and fears that Iraqi Shiites may face deportation, and it can 
be regarded as another example of the role policies play in 
shaping interreligious interactions, both in the country of 
origin and in the hosting society.
Overall, both existing literature and ethnographic 
material suggest caution in attributing lack of commun-
ity cohesion among Iraqi refugees to religious and ethnic 
cleavages only. As already remarked, not all the people who 
left  Iraq for Egypt consider themselves as victims of dispos-
session and lack of social networks, or identify themselves 
as refugees. Diff erences between them and refugees oft en 
revolve around social and economic status. However, as the 
next section will show, for both groups reasons to migrate 
are mixed. Moreover, relations between them are marked 
by ambivalence, oscillating between resentment caused by 
real and perceived inequalities and feelings of solidarity 
resulting from shared national belonging.
Mixed Migration and Iraqi Transnational 
Economic Migrants
A category of Iraqis living in 6th of October City can be con-
sidered as transnational migrants who profi ted from the eco-
nomic liberalization Iraq underwent aft er 2003. Th e volume 
of trade between Egypt and Iraq is reported to have grown 
signifi cantly between 2005 and 2010. According to offi  cial 
statistics, in 2009, 3,196 Iraqi companies were operating in 
Egypt, amounting to 15 percent of total Iraqi foreign invest-
ment.37 Th e relation between these transnational economic 
activities and Iraqi displacement to Egypt is confi rmed by 
a statement made by Mahmoud Mohieddin, the former 
Egyptian Minister of Investment. During the fi rst joint 
Iraqi-Egyptian investment convention, held in Baghdad in 
August 2009, Mohieddin is reported to have commented on 
the high number of Iraqi enterprises in Egypt, expressing 
his hope that “those companies will return to Iraq when 
they have the opportunity. We are following closely what is 
happening in Iraq.”38 Iraqi migrants engaging in commer-
cial and entrepreneurial activities between the two coun-
tries were able to fi nd work and life opportunities in Cairo’s 
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upscale new towns and residential compounds. As foreign 
investors in Egypt, they enjoy a privileged visa regime, and 
do not identify themselves as refugees. On the contrary, 
they tend to underline their diff erence through narratives 
emphasizing their entrepreneurial success and wealthy life-
style. However, many Iraqi entrepreneurs I met in Cairo do 
mention political instability and serious safety concerns 
as reasons for not permanently residing in Iraq or sending 
their families to live abroad.
Wissam, a man in his late 30s, owned a factory in Upper 
Egypt but lived with his wife and two children in 6th of 
October City. When I met him, he ostentatiously showed 
the signs of his economic fortune through branded clothes 
and electronic gadgets.
I am very happy in Egypt. I earn good money, my wife is happy, 
she can relax, go out, she can aff ord going to the gym. My situa-
tion is completely diff erent from refugees and I never had any con-
tacts with the United Nations.
Yet, as our conversation went on, Wissam disclosed how 
his reasons to live abroad were also related to Iraq’s lack of 
stability and security.
I don’t care about Iraq, about what happens there. I only go for 
work, for commercial reasons, do what I have to do and come back. 
I don’t bring my family because it is very dangerous, unlivable, 
especially for women. I don’t care about what happens there.39
Th e case of Iraqis in 6th of October City points to the 
growing relevance of mixed migration in understanding 
the Iraqi displacement.40 Economic concerns and fears of 
persecution and generalized violence are oft en intertwined 
in individual reasons to leave the country. Moreover, Iraqi 
refugees and migrants in Cairo live in proximity and have 
close economic, social, and personal relations. My fi rst 
meeting with Wissam took place in an Iraqi café called Shatt 
el-Arab, a popular place in the 7th District. Named aft er the 
region spanning southeast Iraq and southwest Iran where 
mostly Sabeans live, it was attended exclusively by Iraqi men 
to drink tea and smoke shisha. Th e coff ee shop appeared to 
be a rather socially mixed space, an interesting exception in 
Cairo’s strict spatial segregation along class lines. Wissam’s 
social life took place mostly in that coff ee shop, hanging out 
with his countrymen. Some of them were very good friends 
of his. Others were rather acquaintances who seemed 
uneasy before his physical and verbal exhibition of rich-
ness. However, the socially mixed nature of the coff ee shop 
was largely refl ected in Wissam’s group of friends. Th eir 
case exemplifi es the complex social and economic relations 
between Iraqis who self-identify as refugees and wealthier 
migrants with diff erent legal status. Solidarity and sense of 
national belonging coexist with inequalities and confl icts. 
Although many among his friends were signifi cantly less 
rich than him, Wissam was bound to them by respect and 
esteem. Th ey were, he explained, from honoured families 
with a high educational level and used to have very good 
professional positions. Wissam appeared to be aware of his 
status of nouveau riche. His relation to his Iraqi neighbours 
and friends appeared marked by dual feelings. On the one 
hand he was proud of having been able, unlike many of his 
fellow citizens in Egypt, to profi t from the good opportun-
ities provided by Iraq’s and Egypt’s neo-liberal economies. 
On the other, he expressed a sense of solidarity, respect, and 
even sorrow for people whose cultural capital and respect-
ability used to be somehow superior to his own, but who 
were facing fi nancial diffi  culties in Egypt.
As Wissam, Samira, the 22-year old daughter of a wealthy 
Baghdadi family, was excited about the economic success 
of her family and happy with her life in Egypt. Yet when I 
met her for the fi rst time she also expressed concern about 
the trip to Baghdad her family was planning for the end of 
the year. During a recent visit, a bomb had blasted near her 
parents’ car while they were driving in central Baghdad. 
Th e episode had been very shocking for the whole family. 
It epitomized the lack of security that still aff ected their 
country, and reminded them of the violent destruction they 
had to fl ee from. Similar stories, and the associated feel-
ings of anxiety, are common among the richest Iraqis liv-
ing in Egypt who travel to their home country on a regular 
basis. Drawing a sharp line between the successful stories 
of people like Wissam and Samira, and the painful experi-
ence of disempowerment of refugees who have been hit by 
processes of dispossession would be inaccurate. Among 
the Iraqis I came to know in 6th of October, experiences 
of violence and loss are common to individuals of all social 
backgrounds and economic statuses. Moreover, national 
belonging is one of the most relevant lines along which 
social interactions are organized in the rather international 
environment of 6th of October. However, it oft en conceals 
a number of unexpressed confl icts and divisions around 
social status, in which some individuals and households 
are left  to struggle against impoverishment, oft en without a 
reliable network of support.
Education, Work, and Social Mobility: Th e 
Egyptian Context
Th e Iraqi refugees I met in Cairo adopted several strategies 
to resist downward social mobility, although rarely did they 
prove to be successful. In this regard, the story of Sarah’s 
family is paradigmatic. When I met Sarah, her parents had 
run out of savings trying to support themselves in Egypt. 
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Th e only two sources of income her father had left  were 
the small pension that, like many other Iraqis in Cairo, 
he received from Iraq every month, and a similarly small 
amount of money coming from letting his house in Baghdad. 
Th e house was let to a friend for less than the actual mar-
ket price. Th is was because, as many Iraqis explained, till 
2008 houses let to strangers were oft en looted, or occupied 
by religious militias who forced people to move in planned 
operations of ethno-religious segregation. Letting to rela-
tives and close friends was therefore the only way they had 
to be sure to have their property back. For Sarah’s parents, 
the two sources of revenues together covered the basic 
needs of their six children. Th e parents appeared to be torn 
between desire to return, which explained their decision 
not to sell the house, and hope for a better future for their 
children through resettlement to a Western country. Th ey 
had done their best to guarantee them the same standard 
of living they used to have in Iraq, where they could aff ord 
a car and spending their holidays abroad. Sarah explained 
that her father had spent more than $10,000 US in just 
one year to allow her younger brother to study in one of 
the many expensive private universities of 6th of October 
City, attended mostly by foreign students coming from the 
Gulf region. When the father realized that the debt he was 
accumulating was too severe, her brother was forced to 
interrupt his studies, and as a result, according to Sarah, he 
was drowning in a state of depression.
Education is central in the strategies Iraqis adopt to pre-
serve their social status. Private schools and universities are 
oft en the only option available for Iraqis in Egypt, where 
refugees face restrictions in enrolling their children in pub-
lic education.41 However, many Iraqi families I spoke to 
affi  rmed that, even if they were allowed to, they would not 
send their children to Egyptian public schools. Th e quality 
of the education these provide was perceived as extremely 
poor, especially in foreign languages and technical and sci-
entifi c subjects. Th e idea—widespread among middle-class 
Egyptians—that public schools are for the children of the 
poor and the uneducated seemed to prevail. It is arguable 
that the choice of expensive private education is for Iraqis 
in Egypt a “reconversion strategy.” Bourdieu defi nes this as 
“the set of outwardly very diff erent practices whereby indi-
viduals or families tend, unconsciously or consciously, to 
maintain or increase their assets and consequently to main-
tain or improve their position in the class structure.”42 As in 
Bourdieu’s description, the aim of conserving or improving 
the family’s social position is oft en pursued by exchanging 
one form of capital with another. Investing fi nancial cap-
ital into education is fundamental for middle-class Iraqis.43 
Th is seems to apply both to those hoping to preserve a 
cultural capital threatened by impoverishment, and to the 
new rich attempting to acquire new middle-class legitimacy.
However, for families of refugees like Sarah’s, these 
attempts are oft en diffi  cult to sustain. Also in this, their 
experience mirrors that of local educated urban middle 
classes. Th e Egyptian market for private education is fast-
growing and increasingly expensive. Only people with 
remunerative entrepreneurial careers or employed in the 
upscale, internationally oriented sectors of the job market 
are able to aff ord the kind of investment in education which 
guarantees to their children access to good employment 
opportunities.44 Th is process of social stratifi cation invests 
Iraqi refugees in Cairo. Access to private education also 
corresponds to inclusion in circuits of globalized belonging 
and upscale consumption cultures.45 In one of our meet-
ings, Samira and I had a conversation which helps to illus-
trate this aspect. Her father, she explained, ran a successful 
business which allowed her and her brothers to study in pri-
vate technical faculties. Alongside her major in pharmacy, 
Samira took private lessons in English and informatics.
English is essential nowadays, for any job you want to do, in Iraq, 
Egypt, in any other Arab country. And I love speaking English, 
and have many European friends that I meet every time I go to 
Sharm El Sheykh, about twice or three times a year.46
Samira’s case is also an interesting example of how migra-
tion provides wealthy Iraqi women in Egypt with increased 
opportunities to study, work, and engage in social and rec-
reational activities outside of the space of the home. Like her, 
some of the women I met attributed this to the absence of 
gender and sectarian violence in Egypt, generally perceived 
as a safe country. However, this feeling was altered by the 
uprising started in January 2011, which pushed a signifi cant 
number of families to temporarily leave the country. Shift s 
in gender relations also aff ect families of refugees with lower 
social status. In the cases I had the chance to observe, these 
changes are oft en linked to policies of humanitarian assist-
ance. Services in Egypt are oft en designed around a “femin-
inized” refugee subject, conceived as being in a position of 
need and passivity.47 As a result, women are oft en privileged 
interlocutors in the relation with humanitarian agencies. 
Th is has ambivalent and potentially negative eff ects. On 
the one hand, it seems to increase their power within fam-
ilies. On the other, it contributes to further relegate women 
who are oft en well-educated and with successful working 
histories in the homeland to the exclusive role of caregivers. 
Th e relation between gender, refugee condition, and social 
mobility among Iraqis in Egypt can not be thoroughly 
explored here, and would deserve further research.
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As access to private education and related spaces of 
socialization become increasingly exclusive, a category of 
young Iraqis in Cairo struggle to fi nd other venues of local 
inclusion. For those who have no other option to support 
themselves, access to the lower sectors of the job market 
is mediated through networks of national solidarity. Th e 
restrictions Egypt applies to the 1951 convention exclude 
refugees from access to regular employment. As a result, 
some of them rely on informal, casual jobs in small ethnic 
businesses such as coff ee shops and restaurants, but also in 
factories. Access to these networks of employment is also 
gendered. Social and parental control oft en prevents young 
women from accepting jobs which are deemed to be degrad-
ing, or not adequate to their qualifi cations and social status. 
However, some of the young women I met were employed 
as secretaries or shopping assistants in local Iraqi and 
Egyptian businesses.
Hamed was a young man with a degree in engineer-
ing. He had arrived in Egypt in 2006 with his parents and 
brothers, all registered with UNHCR. His work experience 
in a big supermarket owned by an Iraqi entrepreneur was 
recalled as frustrating.
In the supermarket, he [the employer] used to exploit me. Still, 
he used to exploit Egyptians much more than me. I got a better 
treatment cause I was Iraqi. With me, he would pay me more, EGP 
800 [$135] per month, while Egyptians would earn 600 per month. 
Still, it was ridiculous. 12 hours per day, every single day, from 2 
or 3 pm to 3 am, no holiday at all. No Aid, no Friday, no Sunday, 
nothing at all. If I sick, I don’t get paid. [ … ] I had that life for one 
year. Th en, Ousama [his brother] and me decided to share, for the 
boss was OK. We would share and work 6 hours each, everyday, 
no holidays as I told you, for EGP 800 per month.48
Hamed’s narrative is interesting for at least three rea-
sons. First of all it provides another example of the ambi-
guities that characterize the relationship between refugees 
and wealthy Iraqi migrants. While he had been able to fi nd 
a job thanks to networks within his national community, 
the working conditions had proved to be rather exploita-
tive. Secondly, it off ers interesting insights on labour condi-
tions in Egypt and how they aff ect the less wealthy among 
young Iraqi refugees. Hamed describes the job environ-
ment in factories, supermarkets, and shopping malls in 6th 
of October City as mixed: “You fi nd Egyptians, Africans 
and sometimes Iraqis, but only those who have less money.” 
According to him, foreign workers in the supermarket were 
employed informally, but many Egyptians had no regular 
contracts either. Finally, Hamed’s experience sheds light on 
the mutual perceptions which shape the relation between 
Iraqis and locals. Egyptians, Hamed explained, are paid less 
because they are deemed to be poor and, unlike Iraqis, used 
to low-skilled jobs in dirty and unsafe environments. Th ese 
impressions mirror local perceptions of Iraqi migrants. In 
6th of October, Madinet Nasr, Heliopolis, and Rehab, all 
middle-class areas of Cairo where Iraqi families have set-
tled, Egyptians commonly consider Iraqis as wealthy and 
successful intruders. Th eir affl  uence is oft en blamed for ris-
ing estate prices. In this regard, it is important to remem-
ber how the booming Iraqi oil economy of the 1970s saw 
the immigration of millions of Egyptians, employed in the 
extractive and industrial sectors.49 Mutual perceptions 
of richness and poverty are largely shaped by this shared 
migration history. According to the practitioners I talked 
to, Egyptian stereotypes of Iraqis would be a result of the 
generalized lack of knowledge about refugee problems and 
rights. However, they also refl ect the complex, mixed nature 
of Iraqi migration to Egypt, as well as the local processes of 
social stratifi cation it intersects.
Conclusions
Th e policy categories imposed on the Iraqi displacement 
conceal diff erences between refugee fl ows and other forms 
of migration. People lacking social and fi nancial capital 
are forced to fl ee Iraq and rely on assistance to fi nd durable 
solutions to displacement. However, others have the assets 
to successfully engage in forms of transnational mobility 
and economic activity.50 An approach which re-embeds 
the study of the Iraqi displacement in its socio-historical 
context helps to grasp diff erences and continuities between 
these diff erent kinds of migration. In the case here ana-
lyzed, mixed motivation and frequent economic and social 
relations between these two categories of migrants does 
not allow drawing sharp distinctions. However, feelings 
of inequalities and tensions are common among Iraqis in 
Cairo. Th ese oft en revolve around changes in social status 
caused by displacement and post-confl ict policies in the 
homeland. Existing literature confi rms that these new social 
mobilities deserve further attention, and that their relation 
with ethno-religious sectarianism should be problematized. 
Finally, the paper has off ered insights on how social stratifi -
cation in Egypt infl uences the experience of Iraqi residents 
in the country. A re-embedded approach to the study of Iraqi 
migration in the region cannot but benefi t from a thorough 
analysis of socio-economic change in hosting societies.
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